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HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS:
TWO FEDERAL COURT CASES
— by Neil E. Harl*
Cases filed in recent months involving hedge-to-arrive
contracts are continuing to filter out at the trial court
level.1  The cases were filed after a run-up in grain prices
in late 1995 and early 1996 boosted the cost of rolling
futures contracts forward to later contract months.2  Many
of the contracts, dubbed hedge-to-arrive contracts,
involved the sale of more grain than the producer had in
storage and were typically hedged on a nearby futures
month.  In a typical HTA contract, entered into in October
of 1995, the grain sold was hedged by the elevator with a
March, 1996, futures contract.  That necessitated “rolling”
the futures obligation to May or July and ultimately to the
December 1996 contract—or even later.
A major issue has been whether such contracts are
“cash forward contracts” which are outside the scope of
federal regulations3 or are not within the cash forward
contract exception to federal regulatory law.4  In the latter
event, the contracts run the risk of being “off-exchange”
contracts which are illegal.
In a case decided September 25, 1997, by the
Minnesota Federal District Court involving Grain Land
Coop,5 the contracts permitted the producers to roll their
delivery obligations to a later futures month.  The coop
was obligated to cover margin obligations and, apparently,
the costs involved in rolling the obligations forward.
The case involved lawsuits brought by the cooperative
against approximately 160 producers who had not
delivered grain under the contracts.  The actions were
originally filed in state court but were shifted to federal
court at the request of the producers on the ground that a
federal question was involved—possible applicability of
federal commodity law.
The case was further complicated by complaints of
fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty by
the producers against the coop.
The court reviewed the history of federal law
regulating commodity futures transactions and concluded
___________________________________________________
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that the contracts in question were within the cash forward
contract exception.6  That meant the contracts did not
violate federal regulations governing futures transactions.7
The court noted that the contracts were only entered into
with grain producers and each of the producers had the
ability to deliver the grain.
As for the capacity of the producers to deliver, which
has been considered an important element of the cash
forward contract exception,8 the court stated that “each of
the producers had the ability to make delivery on the
contracts.”  The court then concluded that “the cash
forward contract exclusion...is available for cash contracts
for the sale of grain that are made between persons
engaged in the grain business and that are predicated on
the expectation of actual, albeit deferred, delivery.”  If that
language is meant to say that all contracts for the sale of
commodities by a farmer are within the cash forward
contract exception, a genuine question arises as to whether
CFTC, other trial courts and courts of appeal will agree.
Clearly, the Minnesota decision is not the last word on this
issue.
The court also tossed out the producers’ claims of
fraud and misrepresentation.  The court reasoned that the
contracts were governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code and thus tort claims for fraud and misrepresentation
were barred.
More HTA
A case decided recently by the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Missouri also involved hedge-
to-arrive contracts.9  In that case, the contracts were for
one year and the farmer apparently had enough
commodity (corn and soybeans) on hand or was expected
to produce enough in the current production cycle to cover
the amount specified in the contracts.
The farmer argued that the contracts were governed by
the Commodity Exchange Act10 and were outside the
scope of the cash forward contract exception.  The
elevator’s position was that the contracts were merely cash
forward contracts and were not subject to federal
regulation.
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The Missouri Federal District Court identified several
factors in analyzing whether the contracts in question were
futures contracts, subject to the Commodity Exchange
Act, or were cash forward contracts not subject to CEA.
The factors included— (1) whether the contracts had
“inherent value,” (2) market characteristics; (3) whether
delivery is contemplated; (4) the underlying purpose of the
contracts; (5) whether standardized form contracts were
used; and (6) the nature of the parties to the transactions
involved in the dispute.
The court sided with the elevator and held that the
contracts were within the cash forward contract exception.
Accordingly, the federal court dismissed the action.  The
case now goes back to state court.
*  *  *  *  *
The two cases, in Minnesota and Missouri, both found
the contracts in question to be cash forward contracts.  The
Missouri case, however, did not involve a focus on sales
of crops beyond what was in storage or could be produced
in the current production cycle.  More court decisions are
expected—and these two may be appealed.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 10 Harl, Agricultural Law § 74.04
(1997).
2 See Harl, “Hazards of Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts,” 7
Agric. L. Dig. 77 (1997).
3 7 U.S.C. § 6(a).  See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 312
(9th Cir. 1991).
4 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(11).
5 In re Grain Land Coop Case, Civ. No. 3-96-1209 (D.
Minn. 1997).
6 See n. 4 supra.
7 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(11).
8 H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 129-130
(1974); See CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680
F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1982).  See also
“Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward
Contracts and ‘Trade’ Options,” 50 Fed. Reg. 39656,
Sept. 30, 1985.
9 Bunker v. Farmers Elevator Co. of Hopkins, Civ. No.
97-0137-CV-W-SCW (W.D. Mo. 1997).
10 See n. 2 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. Two banks had obtained judgments against
the debtor on loans made to the debtor for agricultural
operations. The debtor then filed for Chapter 12. Because
the value of the collateral securing the loans was much
less than the judgments, the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
classified the judgments as partially unsecured. The banks
and the debtor negotiated the value of the collateral
securing the claims and the plan included the agreed-to
value which was higher than the value originally attributed
to the property. The court found that the value agreed to
was a negotiated value and not a value determined by
appraisal. The negotiated value was incorporated into the
Chapter 12 plan. The plan did not mention the unsecured
portion of the banks’ claims but did list other unsecured
claims. Under the plan, the unsecured claims would not
receive any payments. The plan was confirmed. During
the plan period, the debtor received an inheritance which
was eventually included in the debtor’s disposable income
available for payment of unsecured claims. The banks
sought a modification of the plan to include their
unsecured claims. The debtor argued that the banks had
waived the unsecured claims. The court agreed, holding
that, because the banks had negotiated a higher value of
the collateral under the original plan in exchange for the
release of their unsecured claims, the banks had waived
those unsecured claims. First Nat’l Bank v. Allen, 118
F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1997).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor had
purchased a farm from a bank for $40,000 in cash and a
contract to pay the remainder in installments. The contract
provided that the bank remained the title holder until the
final installment was paid. At that time, the bank was to
provide a warranty deed to the property. Title insurance
was purchased for the debtor and the contract was
recorded. The bank claimed that the contract was
executory, requiring the debtor to  affirm or reject the
contract. The debtor argued that the contract was a secured
financing device, allowing the debtor to modify the terms
of the contract under the Chapter 11 plan. Although the
court noted that several other courts have held that all land
sale installment contracts were or were not executory, the
court followed In re Robert L. Helms Contr. & Dev. Co.,
110 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1997) in examining all the
circumstances to determine the nature of the contract. The
court examined Idaho law to determine the nature of the
contract rights and obligations. Under Idaho law, when the
debtor’s equity exceeded the seller’s damages from a
breach of the contract, the contract must be foreclosed in
the same manner as a mortgage. The court found that,
under the contract, the bank’s only remaining obligation
under the contract was to supply title to the property and
the debtor’s only obligation was to pay the remaining
obligation. The bank argued that it also had the obligation
to provide marketable title. The court found no basis for
this distinction, noting that the bank would have no
motivation for clouding the title. The court also ignored
the characterization in the contract that the contract was
executory, holding that the true nature of the contract was
to operate as security for the debtor’s obligation to make
